Empirical evidence has suggested that, facing di'erent trading strategies and complicated decision, the proportions of agents relying on particular strategies may stay at constant level or vary over time. This paper presents a simple "dynamic market fraction" model of two groups of traders, fundamentalists and trend followers, under a market maker scenario. Market mood and evolutionary adaption are characterized by .xed and adaptive switching fraction among two groups, respectively. Using local stability and bifurcation analysis, as well as numerical simulation, the role played by the key parameters in the market behaviour is examined. Particular attention is payed to the impact of the market fraction, determined by the .xed proportions of con.dent fundamentalists and trend followers, and by the proportion of adaptively rational agents, who adopt di'erent strategies over time depending on realized pro.ts.
The main goals (among many others) that this stream of research is trying to achieve are (i) to provide insight into the connection between bounded rationality of heterogeneous agents and market behaviour, and (ii) to replicate the economic properties of .nancial time series, in particular the so-called stylized factors observed in high-frequency .nancial markets. These aspects have not been well explained within the traditional paradigms of "eHcient market" and "investor homogeneity" (see e.g. Kirman [17] ).
In this literature devoted to the role of agents' heterogeneity in .nancial markets, the market dominance of di'erent trading strategies represented by di'erent types of traders plays a central role on the market price behavior. Empirical evidence (see e.g. Taylor and Allen [21] ) suggests that the proportions of agents relying on particular strategies (e.g. technical and fundamental analysis) may vary over time, for instance as a result of changes in the time horizon; however, it is clear as well that a certain proportion of "con.dent" traders exist, who do not change their strategy over time. The heterogeneity has been modelled through the well-known fundamentalists and chartists approach and the market dominance has been modelled either implicitly by examining their relative activity impacts, such as Day and Huang [8] and Chiarella [4] in early literature, or explicitly by examining their market fractions, such as Lux [18] , Brock and Hommes [2] and He [12] .
The recent literature about fundamentalists-chartists interaction in .nancial markets has considered either constant proportion models, or time-varying proportion models where, in principle, the whole population of traders may switch across di'erent behavioural rules over time. Moreover, in the latter type of models, such as Brock and Hommes [2] under the Walrasian scenario and Chiarella and He [7] under the market maker scenario, the fraction of agents who follow a particular strategy in each period is completely determined by how each strategy has performed in the past. The time evolution of the fractions is then governed by a unique parameter (the intensity of choice, denoted by in our model), which captures a variety of situations, ranging from the case where the distribution of agents across all available strategies is .xed and uniform and agents are completely insensitive to realized pro.ts (when the intensity of choice is zero) to the case where the whole population of agents in each period relies on the best performing strategy (when the intensity of choice goes to in.nity). Such a framework is capable of generating a wide range of dynamic behaviors (a locally stable equilibrium, a stable closed curve, coexistence of attractors, periodic orbits of high order, chaotic dynamics) as various key parameters change, in particular the intensity of choice which governs the switching among di'erent predictors. However, when market proportions are very sensitive to changes of the .tness function (e.g. realized pro.ts), it is not very clear how the market fraction do actually in1uence the market price. To see such in1uence explicitly, He [12] considers the case of constant market fraction, the so-called market fraction (MF) model. The MF model is used to explain various aspects of .nancial market behaviour and establish connections between the stochastic model and its underlying deterministic system. It shows that the long-run behaviour of asset prices, wealth accumulations of heterogeneous trading strategies and the autocorrelation structure of the stochastic system can be characterized by the dynamics of the underlying deterministic system, the parameters driving traders' behaviour and the market fraction.
Comparing with the empirical .ndings, the above literature focuses on two extreme cases. On the one hand, the .xed market fraction models, such as He [12] , neglect the fact that investors are boundedly rational in the sense that they are likely to use a trial and error strategy when facing complex decision problems. On the other hand, "pure" time-varying proportion models do not distinguish between agents who are con.dent of their behavioral rule and are willing to stay with their strategy over time, and adaptively rational agents who use a particular strategy today but are likely to change strategy tomorrow. This distinction is incorporated, in principle, in this paper, where the .xed fraction represents an underlying .xed market mood, while the switching fraction represents the proportion of adaptively rational agents.
Based on the empirical evidence, this paper extends early literature by considering the case that market fractions have both .xed and adaptive switching components. In each trading period the population of agents is assumed to be distributed among two groups, relying upon di'erent predictors (or strategies, or behavioral rules), fundamental traders (or fundamentalists) and trend followers (or chartists). Their fractions in the market in a given period are determined partially by the past performance of the strategies and partially by a .xed proportion over time. In other words, a "switching" component is introduced into the population of traders, which then consists of adaptively rational agents who select di'erent strategies over time according to a performance measure, and of agents who do not switch and stay with their strategies over time ("con.dent" fundamental traders or trend followers). While the .xed fraction expresses the market mood, the switching fraction captures the e'ect of evolutionary adaption.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 derives the market fraction model of fundamental traders, trend followers, and a market maker. Section 3 reduces the underlying deterministic model to a 4-dimensional nonlinear dynamical system in discrete-time, whose unique steady state and its local asymptotic stability conditions are discussed. Section 4 performs some bifurcation analysis with respect to the key parameters through numerical experiments in order to explore the dynamical behavior of the model when the steady state becomes unstable. It highlights the strong sensitivity of the dynamics to the parameters which capture the prevailing market mood and the proportion of adaptively rational agents. Section 5 concludes while Appendix includes mathematical details related to the local stability conditions of the steady state.
The Model
We consider an asset pricing model with one risky asset and one risk free asset. The latter is assumed to be perfectly elastically supplied at gross return R = 1+r/K, where r is the constant risk free rate per annual and K is the frequency of the trading period per year. Let p t be the price (ex dividend) per share of the risky asset at time t and {D t } be the stochastic dividend process of the risky asset. Then the wealth of investor of type h (h = 1, 2) at t + 1 is given by
where W h,t is investor's wealth at time t and z h,t is the number of shares of the risky asset held by the investor from t to t + 1. Let E h,t and V h,t denote the conditional expectation and variance of type h traders. Denote also by R t+1 := p t+1 + D t+1 Rp t the excess return per share in (t, t + 1). Assume that traders are expected utility maximizers, with exponential utility of wealth function U h (W ) = exp( a h W ), where a h is the risk aversion coeHcient of type h traders. Then, under standard conditional normality assumption, the demand z h,t of a type h trader on the risky assets is given by
In this paper, we assume that there are two types of traders, fundamental traders (or fundamentalists) and trend followers (or chartists), denoted by type 1 and type 2, respectively. Let q 1,t and q 2,t be their market fractions, respectively. We assume that the market fraction has a .xed component and a time varying component. Denote by n 1 and n 2 the .xed proportions of fundamentalists and trend followers, respectively. Then (n 1 + n 2 ) represents the proportion of agents who stay with their strategy over time, while 1 (n 1 + n 2 ) is the proportion of traders who may switch from one strategy to the other: we denote them as switching or adaptively rational agents. Among "switching" agents, denote by n 1,t and n 2,t = 1 n 1,t the proportions of fundamentalists and trend followers at time t, respectively. It follows that the market fraction (q 1,t , q 2,t ) at time t is expressed by q 1,t = n 1 + (1 n 1 n 2 ) n 1,t , q 2,t = n 2 + (1 n 1 n 2 ) n 2,t .
Denote n 0 := n 1 + n 2 , m 0 = (n 1 n 2 )/n 0 , m t := n 1,t n 2,t . Then the fractions of the two types at time t can be rewritten as
Assume zero supply of outside shares. Then the population weighted average excess demand at time t, z e,t , is given by z e,t q 1,t z 1,t + q 2,t z 2,t , or
Following Day and Huang [8] , Lux [18] , Chiarella et al. [5] , Farmer and Joshi [9] and Chiarella and He [7] , the market price in each trading period is determined by a market maker who adjusts the price as a function of the excess demand.
The market maker takes a long position when z e,t < 0 and a short position when z e,t > 0 and the market price is adjusted according to
where µ denotes the corresponding speed of price adjustment and the noise term t N (0, 2 ) is an i.i.d. random disturbance created, for instance, by "noise traders". It then follows from (2)-(4) that
We now describe brie1y how fundamentalists and trend followers form different beliefs about future price and more details can be found in He [12] . Fundamental traders are assumed to have some "superior" information on the fundamental value, or price, p t of the risky asset. They believe that the stock price may be driven away from the fundamental price in the short run, but it will eventually return to the fundamental value. Thus the conditional mean and variance of the price for the fundamental traders are assumed to follow
where p t denotes the fundamental price and 2 1 is a constant variance on the price. The speed of adjustment towards the fundamental price is represented by (1 ), where 0 < < 1. An increase in may thus indicate less con.dence on the convergence to the fundamental price, leading to a slower adjustment.
Unlike the fundamental traders, trend followers are assumed to extrapolate the latest observed price deviation from a long run sample mean price. More precisely, their conditional mean and variance are assumed to follow
where 0 measures the extrapolation from the trend followers, b 2 0, and u t and v t are sample mean and variance, respectively, which follow the following learning process
which represent limiting processes of geometric decay processes when the memory lag tends to in.nity. The parameter (0, 1) measures the geometric decay rate.
In order to specify agents' demand functions we need to specify how agents compute the conditional variance of the dividend D t+1 and of the excess return R t+1 over the trading period. For simplicity we assume that agents share homogeneous beliefs about the dividend process and that the trading period dividend D t is i.i.d. and normally distributed with meanD and variance 
is assumed proportional to the variance of the fundamental price, with no correlation between price and dividend at trading period frequency. It follows that agents' conditional variances of the excess return can be estimated as
1 . Denote by p =D/(R 1) = (K/r)D the long-run fundamental price. It follows thatD = p(R 1). Using (5) and (6) one can compute conditional expected excess returns for the two types of traders
It turns out that agents' optimal demands are given by
Denote by h,t+1 the realized pro.t, or excess return, between t and t + 1 by traders of type h, h = 1, 2, i.e.
Following the approach used by Brock and Hommes [1] , [2] , we assume that the proportion of "switching" agents who choose a certain option (fundamental trader or technical trader) at time t +1 is determined by a discrete-choice model according to the following equation
where C h 0 is a .xed cost associated with strategy h, while the parameter is the intensity of choice measuring the sensitivity of the population of adaptively 2 The long-run fundamental price is given by p = (KD)/r, where KD is the average annual dividend. Let p be the annual volatility of the price p, where represents the annual volatility of 1 dollar invested in the risky asset. Under independent price increments, the trading period variance of the price can be estimated as
the annual dividend and its variance and assume an approximate relationship D (A) = rp between annual dividend and price. Then one gets 2
1 . Assuming zero correlation between price and dividend at trading period frequency, on .nally gets V 1,t (R t+1 ) = 1 + r 2 2 1 and
rational traders to the most pro.table strategy. Note that m t+1 = n 1,t+1 n 2,t+1 . Then
To sum up, the laws of motion of the complete model of asset price dynamics are determined by the following random discrete-time dynamical system
where q 1,t , q 2,t are given by (2) and z 1,t , z 2,t are given by (7) . The fundamental price is assumed to follow a random walk, such that
Following sections are devoted to analysis on the dynamics of the nonlinear model (8)- (12).
Dynamics of The Deterministic System
The dynamical model (8)- (12) has been extensively studied by He [12] under the particular case of .xed market fraction, i.e. q 1,t = n 1 , q 2,t = n 2 and n 1 + n 2 = 1 for all t. In this more general case with both .xed and time-varying fractions, the deterministic skeleton of the stochastic model is obtained from (8)- (12) by setting the noise terms in equations (8) and (12) equal to zero, by assuming a constant dividend D per time period and a constant fundamental p t that is equal to the long-run fundamental price p t = p = D(R 1). Accordingly, we obtain from (8)- (11) a four-dimensional deterministic dynamical system, driven by the following
T :
where
. 3 The symbol denotes the unit time advancement operator.
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We now turn to the existence and uniqueness of the steady-state and its local stability analysis. This is summarized in the following Proposition and its proof is given in the Appendix.
Proposition: (i). The 4-dim map (13) has a unique fundamental steady state (p, u, v, m) = (p, p, 0, m) withp = D/(R 1) and m = tanh( (C 2 C 1 )/2). At the steady state, the equilibrium fraction is given by (q 1 , q 2 ) with
(ii). The fundamental steady state is locally asymptotically stable (LAS) in a region of the space of the parameters ( , µ) determined by the union of the two regions 1 and 2 , such that
In addition a %ip bifurcation occurs along the boundary µ = µ 1 ( ) for 0 < 0 (where one of the eigenvalues of G is equal to 1, while the other is smaller than one in modulus) and a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs along the boundary µ = µ 2 ( ) for 0 (where the two eigenvalues are complex conjugate of modulus equal to one). 
Global Dynamics and Market Price Behavior
This section complements the previous one in that, (i) it performs bifurcation and sensitivity analysis with respect to the key parameters near the "NeimarkSacker" bifurcation boundary, and (ii) it focuses on the role played by the parameters which determine the market fraction, i.e. n 0 and m 0 , in order to capture the joint e'ect of market mood and evolutionary adaption.
Dynamical Behavior Beyond the Neimark Boundary
The goal of this section is to explore the dynamical behavior of the market beyond the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation boundary, where the fundamental steady state is an unstable focus and trajectories converge towards another attractor. In all of the numerical experiments of this paper we choose r = 0.05, K = 250 (which means a daily trading frequency) and therefore R = 1 + r/K = 1.0002. It is also assumed D = 0.02, p = D/(R 1) = 100, = 0.2 (and therefore . In other words, the fundamental steady state becomes unstable with higher extrapolation ( ) and memory parameter ( ) from the trend followers, higher speed of price adjustment from the market maker (µ), higher switching intensity ( ), lower con.dence of the fundamentalists on the fundamental price (i.e. higher ), lower risk aversion coeHcient (a), lower .xed fraction of the fundamentalists or higher .xed fraction of the chartists (i.e. lower n 0 m 0 = n 1 n 2 ). This result is very intuitive. The Neimark-Sacker bifurcation creates a stable closed curve. In general, the size of the attractor increases as the above parameters are increased (decreased) further beyond their bifurcation values. Fig. 2a represents the projection in the (p, u)-plane of a trajectory which converges to a closed curve (for = 1.25), while the projection of the same attractor in the (p, m)-plane is represented by an eight-shaped closed curve in Fig. 2b . Examples of sample trajectories of the fundamental price and the market price obtained from the noisy model with the base parameter selection (for which the steady state is a stable focus) are presented in Figs. 2c,d . They show that the price path seems to depart from the fundamental path occasionally, but after a number of periods mean reverting forces bring the price back to fundamental. In particular, comparing to the previous example, agents now are less risk averse and the conditional variance estimated by trend followers has much lower sensitivity to the sample variance. On the other hand, the mean reverting force of the fundamental traders is higher (lower ) and agents' sensitivity to the relative pro.tability of the strategies is lower. Starting from these base values, numerical experiments show that the bifurcation values of the parameters, assuming the rest is .xed, are as follows: increasing (with 0.86 < < 0.87), (with 0.77 < < 0.78), (with 0.89 < < 0.9), µ (with 1.30 < µ < 1.31), (with 0.37 < < 0.38); decreasing a (with 0.4 > a > 0.39), n 0 (with 0.25 > n 0 > 0.24), m 0 (with 0.09 > m 0 > 0.1). In this case, when one of the parameters is beyond its Neimark-Sacker bifurcation value, the system in the long run settles down on a wide attracting closed curve. It is worth noticing that the stable closed curve in question already exists when the parameters are within the stability domain, i.e. the stable curve coexists with a stable steady state for those parameter ranges. This phenomenon of coexistence of a stable equilibrium and a stable limit cycle has been detected in other models of fundamentalist-chartist interaction (see e.g. Gaunersdorfer et al. [11] ). Figs. 3a,b represent the price trajectories generated by the same initial condition and slightly di'erent values of the .xed proportion n 0 (0.25 and 0.24, respectively). Figs. 3c,d are obtained with the same parameter set, except for n 0 = 0.5, under two slightly di'erent initial conditions, showing the coexistence of attractors in the stable regime. Notice the abrupt change of asymptotic dynamics follows from a small change of the .xed fraction n 0 (Figs.  3a,b) or of the initial sample mean price u 0 of trend followers (Figs. 3c,d) . 
Role of Market Mood and Evolutionary Adaption
The previous examples show that both market mood and proportion of switching agents play an important role in the dynamics of the present model. For instance, the bifurcation analysis performed in the previous section has shown that, other things being .xed, small changes in the parameter n 0 (a small increase of the proportion 1 n 0 of switching agents) or m 0 (a small change in the structure of the .xed fraction, or market mood, in favour of trend followers) can change the steady state from stable to unstable. In a way, this phenomenon is not surprising under the parameters selection used in the previous example, where the situation is one with high proportion of switching agents (75%), and equal proportions of fundamentalists and trend followers within the fraction of .xed-strategy agents. However, the same phenomenon can be observed under less intuitive and extreme situations. In principle, by addressing the following two questions, we show that a small change of the market model, which can be treated as a small change of market psychology, can change the market price behavior dramatically and this phenomenon has not been observed and examined in the literature.
The .rst question is whether, in principle, a small change of the market mood towards fundamental traders can stabilize an otherwise unstable market, even in a situation where there is a high fraction of adaptively rational agents, and the market mood is essentially characterized by chartist beliefs. The parameters used in our third example are the following: a 1 = a 2 = a = 0.5, = 0.5, = 2, = 0.275, µ = 1, = 1, b 2 = 0.05 and therefore b = b 2 / 2 1 = 0.03125; the fraction of con.dent agents is low, n 0 = 0.15, and chartist beliefs prevail, m 0 = 0.8. This means that the fraction n 1 of con.dent fundamentalists is only 1.5% of the whole agent population, while the fraction n 2 of con.dent trend followers is 13.5%. We now increase the parameter m 0 from 0.8 to 0.7 for .xed n 0 (i.e. without altering the total proportion of .xed-strategy agents). Then the proportion n 1 of fundamental traders is slightly increased from 1.5% to 2.25% while the proportion n 2 of trend followers is decreased from 13.5% to 12.75%. Conversely, the second related question is whether a small increase of the fraction of switching agents can destabilize the market, even in a "quiet" situation where the .xed fraction is high (thus the proportion of adaptively rational agents is small) and the market mood is essentially characterized by fundamentalist beliefs. The parameters of our fourth example are the following: a 1 = a 2 = a = 0.5, = 0.25, = 2.5, = 0.9, µ = 1, = 1.5, b 2 = 0.05 and therefore b = b 2 / 2 1 = 0.03125; the fraction of .xed-strategy agents is high, n 0 = 0.8, and the fundamentalist beliefs prevail, m 0 = 0.75, i.e. the fraction n 1 of con.dent fundamentalists is 70% of the whole population of agents, while the fraction n 2 of con.dent trend followers is 10%. We then decrease the parameter n 0 from 0.8 to 0.75 with .xed m 0 (i.e. without altering the proportion of the two strategies within the population of con.dent agents). Accordingly, the proportion of adaptively rational agents is increased from 20% to 25% and the fractions of the con.dent fundamentalists and trend followers are decreased from 70% and 10% to 65.625% and 9.375%, respectively. Figs. 5a,b represent the trajectories of the price for n 0 = 0.8 and n 0 = 0.75, respectively, starting with the same initial condition. While for n 0 = 0.8 the trajectory converges to steady state, for n 0 = 0.75 the trajectory converges to an attractor characterized by wide price 1uctuations, whose projection in the planes (p, u) and (p, m) is represented in Figs. 5c,d , respectively. One can easily check that this change of regime occurs suddenly when n 0 is decreased below the "threshold" value n 0 , where 0.787 > n 0 > 0.786.
*** FIG. 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE ***
The examples presented in this section show that our model, which accounts simultaneously for market mood and evolutionary adaption, has the potential to explain important aspects of .nancial market psychology and rational adaptiveness of agents.
Conclusion
Empirical evidence has suggested that, facing di'erent trading strategies and complicated decision, the proportions of agents relying on particular strategies (e.g. technical and fundamental analysis) may stay at constant level or vary over time. The .rst case can be used to characterize the market mood or market psychology where agents are con)dent about the trading strategies they selected and do not change their strategies over certain time horizon, while the second case can be used to characterize the evolutionary adaption where agents are boundedly rational and adaptively switching their trading strategies based on their performance. Consequently, it is believed that the market price behaviour can be greatly in1uenced by both the market mood and evolutionary adaption. Two of the extreme cases where the market fractions are either .xed or adaptive switching have been modelled and examined in the literature. However, to our knowledge, this paper is the .rst one to explicitly model and examine the joint impact of both the market mood and evolutionary adaption characterized by .xed and changing market fractions, respectively. This paper has developed a nonlinear discrete-time asset pricing model of fundamental traders and trend followers, who interact in a .nancial market with one risky asset and a riskless asset, under a market maker scenario. The model allows for evolutionary adaption of agents, with time varying proportions of the two groups depending on realized pro.ts, but also assumes that a given proportion of fundamentalists and trend followers remains .xed over time. As expected, we have shown that the market is stable (unstable) when it is dominated by the fundamentalists (trend followers) and both locally stable steady-state and limit cycle can coexist. We have also shown that both the market mood, determined by the weight of the two strategies among .xed-strategy agents, and the proportion of adaptively rational agents, which captures the impact of evolutionary adaption, play important role for asset price behavior. In particular, we have shown that (i) a small change of the market mood towards fundamental traders can stabilize an otherwise unstable market, and (ii) a small change of the proportion of adaptive rational agents can destabilize an otherwise stable market. The model essentially provides insight into the connection between .nancial market behavior and the market psychology and rational adaptiveness of agents. The deterministic skeleton of the stochastic model plays the most important role in understanding the stochastic nature of the model. However, how the dynamics of the stochastic model is connected to the dynamics of its underlying deterministic model is even more, but diHcult question. There are two approaches currently addressing this issue. The .rst approach is to conduct statistical analysis through Monte Carlo simulation and to establish connection between various statistic properties, such as the autocorrelation patterns of returns and long-range dependence, of the stochastic model and the stability and bifurcation of the underlying deterministic model. For the .xed market fraction model, He and Li [13] show that convergence of market price to fundamental value, long-and short-run pro.tability of the two trading strategies, survivability of chartists and various under-and over-reaction autocorrelation patterns can be explained by the stability and bifurcations of the underlying deterministic system. The potential of the MF model in explaining some of the stylized facts of .nancial markets is also explored in He and Li [14] , and it shows that heterogeneity, trend chasing through learning, and the interplay of stable deterministic equilibria and stochastic noisy processes can be the source of power-law distributed 1uctuations. This result is further veri.ed via Monte Carlo simulation and statistical analysis on the decay patterns of autocorrelation functions of returns, squared returns and absolute returns, and the estimates of (FI)GARCH (1, 1) parameters. Given the 1exibility of our model, it is hoped that our model would generate more robust connections and more realistic statistic features. Another approach is to conduct theoretic analysis to the stochastic model directly. By considering a .nancial market as a large number of interacting heterogeneous agents, Föllmer et al. [10] and Horst [16] examine the asymptotics of both aggregate behaviour and asset prices. They derive suHcient conditions under which the distribution of equilibrium prices converge to a unique limit distribution, which may be thought of as the appropriate equilibrium notion for such markets. Our model in this paper is closely related to these work and further examination on the relation to the stochastic model would be interesting and challenging.
Appendix: Proof of the Proposition
The existence of the fundamental steady state can be easily checked. The uniqueness follows from the fact that, at the fundamental equilibrium, the realized excess return is zero p +D Rp = 0 and agents' demands are zero z 1 = z 2 = 0. In fact, use in general the symbolˆfor equilibrium quantities (possibly di'erent from the fundamental steady state). Note that in equilibrium p = u, v = 0 and the excess demand must be zero, q 1 z 1 + q 2 z 2 = 0. Equilibrium demands are given by
.
Since R 1 + r/K > 1 > , both ( R) and (1 R) are negative which implies that z 1 and z 2 are both zero if p =p, otherwise they have the same sign.
In the latter case, given that q 1 , q 2 0, q 1 + q 2 = 1, the excess demand would be di'erent from zero, which is not compatible with equilibrium. This implies that p =p. The conditions of local asymptotic stability of the steady state are determined by the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the map T , evaluated at the steady state itself (let us denote it by J).
Let us compute .rst the Jacobian in the generic point (p, u, v, m) of the phase-space. Consider .rst the derivatives of the agents' demand functions with respect to the state variables dz 1 dp
Consider the partial derivatives of p with respect to the state variables at time t
dz1 dp
The partial derivatives of u and v with respect to the state variables at time t are given by Denote A := 1 tanh
Finally, we evaluate all the partial derivatives at the steady state. At the fundamental steady state, p = p = u = p, z 1 = z 2 = 0 and (p +D Rp) = 0. It follows that the Jacobian evaluated at the steady is given by the following block diagonal matrix
where (at the steady state)
The structure of J implies that two eigenvalues are 0 and (and thus they are real, non negative and smaller than one). The remaining eigenvalues are the ones of the upper-left two-dimensional block (and their location with respect to the unit circle can be studied by means of the usual techniques for second-order characteristic equations). Therefore, we turn our attention to the eigenvalues of the block
As it is known, a necessary and suHcient condition for both of them to be less than one in modulus is provided by the following set of inequalities
where tr(G) and det(G) denote trace and determinant of the matrix G, respectively. Using the notation m q = q 1 q 2 = n 0 m 0 + (1 n 0 ) m,
. Also, using the notations % a 2 /a 1 and Q 2a 2
which is always true given that 1 m q 1 and < 1 < R.
which is satis.ed when either the left-hand side is negative or zero, i.e. when
or it is strictly positive but lower than the right-hand side, i.e. < 2 and
Condition det(G) < 1 can be rewritten as
which is satis.ed when either the left-hand side is negative or zero, i.e.
or it is strictly positive but lower than the right-hand side, i.e. for > 1 and
Note that for (0, 1), 1 < 2 and µ 1 ( ) is an increasing function of for < 2 , while µ 2 ( ) is a decreasing function of for > 1 . Denote by 0 the solution of µ 1 ( ) = µ 2 ( ), i.e.
and note that 0 ( 1 , 2 ). It follows that (see also Fig. 1 ) the region of local stability in the plane of the parameters ( , µ) is the union of the two regions, which we denote by 1 and 2 . In addition a 1ip bifurcation occurs along the boundary µ = µ 1 ( ) for 0 < 0 (where one of the eigenvalues of G is equal to 1, while the other is smaller than one in modulus) and a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation occurs along the boundary µ = µ 2 ( ) for 0 (where the two eigenvalues are complex conjugate of modulus equal to one). 
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